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Abstract 
In this paper the place of psychoanalysis in thinking about postcolonial subjectivities is 
considered, and reference is made to the contemporary South African situation. The paper is 
divided into two sections. First, it is shown that, with its attention to the unconscious, to the 
past and its disguised repetition, psychoanalysis is especially attuned to the displaced routes 
of colonial desire after the end of official colonial (or apartheid) rule. The second section then 
considers Frantz Fanon’s strategic deployment of psychoanalysis, focussing on the way 
Fanon reworked key psychoanalytic concepts in Black Skin, White Masks, emphasizing what 
he referred to as ‘sociogeny,’ the way colonial neuroses are produced out of an internalization 
– or ‘epidermalization’ in Fanon’s terms – of racist social structure. The argument made is 
that psychoanalysis must, if it is to be a part of a critical frame for postcolonial subjectivities, 
be rendered not only instrument but also object of analysis, a part of the very social structure 
towards which Fanon shifted his attention. Psychoanalysis is adept at throwing into relief 
repetitions of the colonial past. Nonetheless, psychoanalytic thinking, pervasive in a post-
apartheid context – i.e. not simply at the isolated level of clinical or scholarly practice, but as 
a discursive lens for engagements with the South African national past, as exemplified in the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – emerges as itself a particular kind of 
acting out the colonial past at an epistemological level.   
 
Key words: Psychoanalysis, Freud, Fanon, postcolonial, post-apartheid, neurosis, memory, 
repetition  
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Fanonian ambivalence: On psychoanalysis and postcolonial critique 
Introduction  
In this paper we draw attention to some of the dilemmas in thinking about postcolonial 
subjectivities, placing Frantz Fanon’s (1952) Black Skin, White Masks – the most explicitly 
psychoanalytical of his texts – at the centre of our concerns. To be specific, it is Fanon’s 
ambivalent relation to psychoanalysis, his repetition of its concepts, often against their 
origins, aware always of their potential to transmit, re-inscribe and reify certain ideologically-
loaded Eurocentric ideas (Adams, 1970; Bulhan, 1985), that we want to propose as a 
productive way to think about postcolonial subjectivities.
1
  
Critical psychology, the discipline from which we write, has long since registered the 
influence of French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault (Hook, 2009), and along with 
it, a shift towards the socio-historical constitution of the subject, towards the way discursive 
practices “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972, p. 54). This 
line of theory casts serious doubts over notions of psychical structures and operations, 
including those of psychoanalytic theory. This de-psychologizing of critical psychology was 
no doubt necessary as a corrective to the universalizing tendencies of mainstream psychology 
(Parker, 1997). However, warnings against the perils of psychological reductionism too often 
provide an excuse to dismiss from serious consideration the psychical dimensions of power. 
If subjectivities are not merely the effect of colonial and neocolonial distributions of power, 
but are also their conduits, their channels of transmission, then a key question revolves 
around how one might critically and strategically draw on psychoanalytic concepts as a 
                                                          
1
 Fanon’s ideas are not, of course, beyond reproach, and this becomes important particularly when one considers 
those less celebrated aspects of his writings, such as his passages on homosexuality and black women, which 
have put him on the sharp end of feminist and gender studies critiques. While conceding this, it is not our central 
concern here. 
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means of thinking about a psychic dimension to the persistence of colonialism (House, 2005). 
We suggest, with reference to Fanon’s (1952, 1961) work, an approach that not only deploys 
psychoanalysis to read the unconscious repetitions of the colonial past in the present, indeed, 
the displacements of colonial desire in postcolonial subjectivities (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000), 
but one that also draws upon a growing body of scholarship that foregrounds the coloniality 
and/or racism of psychoanalytic thinking itself (Berger, 1999; Campbell, 2000; Frosh, 2010; 
Spillers, 1996). The aim is thus to render psychoanalysis both instrument and object of 
postcolonial critique (Khanna, 2003). 
Early on in Black Skin Fanon (1952) makes two assertions. Firstly, he establishes the 
pathological nature of the colonial situation that stems from and is articulated in two distinct 
but intertwined desires: “The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately 
trying to achieve the rank of man” (p. xiii). Secondly, Fanon asserts the centrality of 
psychoanalysis for a critique of colonialism; indeed, for Fanon, “only a psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the black problem can reveal the affective disorders responsible for this 
network of complexes” (p. xiv). The desire to be white is what Fanon would go on to 
diagnose, in the language of psychoanalysis, as a kind of neurosis. Likewise, psychoanalysis 
for Fanon was crucial in characterising and critiquing the place occupied within the colonial 
relation by the colonizer, and in this regard he piled up the diagnoses of the colonizer’s 
paranoid and neurotic disorders (Macey, 2000; McCulloch, 1983).  
We are not, despite the elision of ‘the psychological’ that has taken place in the wake of 
Foucault-inspired critical psychology, averse to Foucauldian analytics. Indeed, a key text in 
proposing Fanonian ambivalence towards psychoanalysis as a productive way to think about 
postcolonial subjectivities is Foucault’s (1970) The Order of Things, specifically the final 
chapter of that book. While Fanon uses psychoanalysis to diagnose the white man’s 
production of ‘the black other’ in achieving the “rank of man,” Foucault places 
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psychoanalysis within the human sciences, through which “Western culture had given itself 
in one century a certain image of man” (p. 361). In a counter intuitive move, Foucault reads 
the seemingly unrelated texts of psychoanalysis and ethnology – the colonial discipline par 
excellence, concerned with the creation of Western man through what he is not, the racial 
other, ‘the primitive’ – alongside one another. Foucault suggests that both psychoanalysis and 
ethnology depend on the same underlying notion of History. For Foucault, this is what 
grounds all of the human sciences, but while the human sciences construct the consciousness 
of Western man, what he is and ought to be, towards which he is always supposedly 
developing, psychoanalysis and ethnology are directed to that which cannot be admitted to 
civilization, and, in Foucault’s words, “we see the destiny of man being spun before our very 
eyes, but being spun backwards; it is being led back by those strange bobbins, to the form of 
its birth” (p. 381).   
Neurosis in Freud’s (1918) thinking is a kind of regression to an earlier phase of 
development, to infantile primitivity, entailing a fixation on a particular erotogenic zone of 
the body. Commenting on Freud’s conception of primitivity in this developmental sense, on 
the one hand, and racialized primitivity in the anthropological sense, on the other, Celia 
Brickman (2003) has argued compellingly that they are not separable. Rather than being 
limited to a few unfortunate references to the anthropological primitive, Brickman reads 
Freud’s entire oeuvre as being underpinned by evolutionary theory: 
 
Because the developmental trajectory in psychoanalysis was itself mapped 
onto an evolutionary trajectory, regression was believed to retrace not only the 
steps of individual development but also of human evolution: regression 
always moves (backwards) along an ontogenetic and phylogenetic path at one 
and the same time (p. 86).   
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In regressing to the early unremembered formative events of childhood, or in acting out a 
primal scene through an adult neurosis, one is, according to Freudian theory, recapitulating 
the early developmental history of the human species – thus, for example, the developing 
child’s ego displays features of cannibalism, its identification with its parents a process of 
taking the loved object or part thereof into the ego’s economy of drives (see Freud, 1923, 
1921, 1917), and the anthropological primitive is constituted as being at a relatively early 
stage of human evolution, a child of man. There is, thus, no way of referring to psychological 
regression, as Freud does and as Fanon does in following Freud, without invoking a latent 
colonial discourse, as “the idea itself carries with it the imprint of the evolutionary premises 
with their racial entailments on which it was originally constructed” (Brickman, 2003, pp. 76-
77).  
The risk, then, in Fanon’s use of psychoanalysis, lies in this racially coded subtext, this 
excess that haunts psychoanalytic diagnoses. Freud’s work can be read as a critique of 
Western European society: not only did he propose that infantile primitivity persists into 
adulthood – in neuroses but also in those aspects of everyday life considered healthy, mature 
– he also suggested that primitivity, in the anthropological sense, against which Western 
Europe was defining itself, persists in what are taken to be markers of Western European 
civilization. Nevertheless, the opposition between primitivity and civilization is what grounds 
Freud’s thinking, enables it. If we follow Ranjana Khanna’s (2003) argument in Dark 
Continents, which builds on Foucault’s thesis, psychoanalysis – much like the disciplines of 
ethnology, anthropology and archaeology – was coextensive with colonialism. That is, the 
conditions of possibility for psychoanalytic thought were the same as those that made 
colonialism possible: an opposition between civilization and that which cannot be admitted to 
civilization, the primitive. This is enabled by linking this primitiveness to the past, thereby 
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situating European civilization at the pinnacle of human evolution. As Freud (1900) put it as 
early as The Interpretation of Dreams in his discussion of psychic regression, “that which is 
older in point of time is at the same time formally primitive” (p. 280).  
While in terms of its effects and its context of application the psychoanalytic talking 
cure is quite different from the civilizing mission of colonialism – which sought to educate 
the primitivity out of the colonized, although not so much as to erase their difference, only 
enough to fetishize the so called native as not fully European, the same but not quite in Homi 
Bhabha’s (1994) formulation – psychoanalysis and ethnology do bear, as Foucault (1970) put 
it, a “profound kinship and symmetry” (p. 378), being issued from the same episteme. The 
crucial difference between ethnology and psychoanalysis is that the former is “traditionally 
the knowledge we have of people without history,” people relegated to timeless primitivity, 
excluded from the social, while the latter is a form of knowledge about those whose past is 
both held and withheld in the repetition of the past in the transference relationship (Foucault, 
1970, p. 376). In “Remembering, Repeating and Working-through,” for instance, Freud’s 
(1914) central argument is that a repetition of the past in the transference relationship 
between analyst and analysand is, at once, a form of remembering and of resistance to 
remembering. As Freud put it, “the patient does not remember anything of what he has 
forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he 
repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (p. 150).  
It is with the notion of repetition – precisely what psychoanalysis interprets – that we 
can treat psychoanalytic interpretations themselves as a form of acting out the colonial past. 
Psychoanalytic concepts have histories, and marshalling them for political use without careful 
genealogical work, as Diana Fuss (1994) has argued, is bound to repeat the effects of the 
concept’s unremembered past or, at least, an unacknowledged relation to its epistemological 
foundations (Khanna, 2003).   
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In our engagement with Fanon, we refer to the South African context. South African 
(neo)colonialism may have been in certain respects different to and – in its apartheid 
incarnation – more extreme and prolonged than in other places in the world, but the 
contemporary South African situation exemplifies the persistence of the colonial past.
2
 We 
use it as a point of focus, then, not only because it is a context with which we’re familiar, but 
also because it dramatizes the challenges at hand.  
The working example we use is a narrative submitted online to the Apartheid Archive, 
an inter-disciplinary research project (see http://www.apartheidarchive.org/site/) that “aims to 
examine the nature of the experiences of racism of (particularly ‘ordinary’) South Africans 
under the old apartheid order and their continuing effects on individual and group functioning 
in contemporary South Africa,” (Apartheid Archive Project, p. 1). The focus of this project is, 
in other words, on everyday racism as opposed to the gross human rights violations of a 
strictly political kind that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) heard in the 
1990s. The narrative is used to demonstrate what a more orthodox Freudian reading might 
look like, focusing on an individual diagnosis. We then move to a Fanonian psychoanalytic 
‘socio-diagnostics,’ making occasional reference back to the narrative. As we follow the 
trajectory that forms between Freud and Fanon – and we could well have focussed on 
Fanon’s reworking of a number of other psychoanalytic ideas, for instance, his critique and 
use of Jung, Adler, Mannoni or Lacan’s work (in this respect see Bulhan, 1985; Gibson, 
2003) – we suggest that psychoanalytic discourse has to be taken as a part of the societal 
psycho-pathology diagnosed.  
                                                          
2
 The ambiguous qualification of the (neo)colonial nature of apartheid stems from the fact that, strictly speaking, 
the independent republic of South Africa is already, by 1961, a ‘postcolonial’ state, free of colonial rule, despite 
that it implemented a system of racialised oppression commensurate with racist colonial regulation in other parts 
of the world. 
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Psychoanalysis and the diagnosis of individual psycho-pathology 
We quote the narrative at length here as it provides a textured and quite florid impression of 
how the apartheid past is frequently remembered:  
 
A black man in blue overalls – the ‘standard issue’ uniform of black labourers 
– was walking towards me as I left a cafe. The cafe was just across the road 
from a public toilet, essentially a black man’s toilet ... an intimidating, squalid 
little building where I never saw any whites go. The toilet was opposite a 
bottle store ... Black men would buy milk stout beer there, a type of beer 
(castle milk stout) somehow marked apart – black man’s beer. Even that was 
an upmarket product compared to that perfect marker of difference, ‘leopard 
beer’ I think it was called, a very cheap mass-produced beer which seemed 
perhaps to be a more traditional form of beer.... It looked toxic, too under-
marketed, I would never drink that – you only bought that, presumably, if you 
had no other choice. 
Alongside the bottle store was a little bicycle repair shop, grubby and 
uncared for ... Next to it was a greasy pie shop, likewise unclean, smelly. This 
row of shops, along with the ‘African toilet,’ which always smelt bad and 
whose walls seemed stained with piss, was a kind of infra-zone, a grey-area 
that somehow existed below (but within) the norms of a white suburb. The 
man who ran the bicycle shop was a tiny Greek man – ‘very Greek’ we would 
have said – perhaps like the cafe owner across the road (or perhaps 
Portuguese), a racial designation that didn’t matter all that much as long as one 
understood that it was one degree apart, at the edge of the degree-by-degree 
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differentiation of white from black. Low income whites made for something of 
a difficult-to-place category. It would be only later that I would be introduced 
to ‘poor whites,’ pointed out to me by my mother in Vrededorp, Johannesburg. 
They seemed more socially distant, more anxiety provoking even than 
blacks...  
The toilet was scary – I always wondered what it looked like on the 
inside of those brick walls ... I was frightened, a little disturbed, I guess, of 
their ‘rights’ to be there. I was always too young, too small, too innocent, not 
man enough (not black man enough?) to go in there. There was also an open-
air barber nearby... The question that sometimes presented itself to my mind 
but that went always unvoiced was whether I would ever get my hair cut there 
or at a place like this; whether it would even be possible, whether these were 
different clippers for different hair (‘peppercorns’ was the word used to 
describe black hair); or that this was ridiculous because such unhygienic 
conditions – dirty clippers, unclean scissors – would simply never be an option 
... There were often bits of black hair scattered around this ungrassy, dusty 
section of ground that I crossed between my bus-stop and home. These little 
‘scalped’ bits and squares of ‘peppercorn’ hair – which manifested themselves 
as throwaway tokens of worthlessness, of lives that didn’t matter, bodily 
scraps that connoted moral inferiority, a closeness to thingness – seemed 
always so different to my own. 
He came towards me, heading into the cafe, in his blue overall. This was 
always a bit of an anxious moment, where one needed to obey the right rules 
of disinterest, to maintain a measured distance, nothing by way of 
confrontation. A kind of professional distance, in short, suitable for 
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interactions with those who worked for you. I only realized afterwards what 
had happened. He had moved his hand awkwardly, putting something away, 
obscuring something. His overalls had been open all the way down to the 
waist, open too low, and he had tucked himself back in. This was the first time 
I had ever seen (but had not seen, because it was black), a black penis. That 
question, never quite resolved, had come back once or twice after glimpses of 
black men in pornography: how could they not have a pink head, a pink glans, 
how could that flesh be black too? A question which seemed to suppose that 
actually, as when you saw a black man’s, a black woman’s hands, the less 
dark side, their palms, their fingernails, there bodily difference was minimal. 
The lightened areas, fingernails, that zone of the body closest to pink, to pale, 
those places could have been the opening possibility, the anxiety-deflating 
proof that (‘they’), black people, seemed similar – similar but different too, no 
doubt – that there was a kind of reassuring, common-denominator similarity. 
That those parts of the body were more absent than present became the proof 
of difference (Compendium of Apartheid Archive narratives, Narrative 59, 
2010). 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of this narrative is its highly reflexive tone. The narrator 
dwells within the racist logic of apartheid, conjuring the past with incredible attention to 
detail. He also problematizes the past; indeed, he conjures the past so as to problematize it, 
including who he was and how he saw things then. It is, we would suggest, less an account of 
the apartheid past than a reconstitution of the past, telling us much more about the post-
apartheid present and the conditions according to which one can narrate the past. Because the 
narrative is, in a sense, an elaborate fantasy about something that may or may not have 
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happened, one can immediately see how useful psychoanalysis could be here, and at least two 
prominent psychoanalytic themes can be read in the text.  
Following the first sentence, where the narrator alludes to what this story is about – 
how, for the first time, he “had ever seen (but had not seen, because it was black), a black 
penis” – he goes into a four-paragraph digression, picking up again at the start of the final 
paragraph. The digression is not without its significance, as we will see below; it will suffice 
at this stage, though, to point to how there is a formal replication here, in the first and last 
paragraphs, of how Freud described little boys encountering for the first time their mother’s 
absence of a penis, or, at least, how his adult neurotic patients recounted childhood memories 
of this formative event.   
In “The Sexual Theories of Children” the first fantasy Freud (1908) outlined, a 
fantasy little boys have when confronted with sexual difference, “consists in attributing to 
everyone, including females, the possession of a penis, such as the boy knows from his own 
body” (p. 215, emphasis in original). Confronted with a body without a penis, the little boy 
disavows its absence, “the boy’s estimate of its value is logically reflected in his inability to 
imagine a person like himself who is without this essential constituent” (pp. 215-216). Here, 
though, the scene is framed in racial terms. Of course, the black penis is a familiar cast 
member in the theatre of white racial fantasies, and here it takes on an overdetermined role, at 
once threatening castration in its implied largeness, but also, in its absence of white skin – 
white skin as a phallic signifier in a racialized society like South Africa (see Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000) – it comes to stand for the ‘social castration’ described throughout the rest of the 
narrative. The seeing and not seeing of the black penis, then, can stand for the poverty and 
abjection that is both seen and not seen, that is disavowed in an overly intellectualized 
narrative. And although it may be a stretch to propose palms and fingernails, those parts of 
13 
 
the body “closest to pink, to pale,” as a kind of fetish object, there is nevertheless, around 
these body parts, an anxious search for a “reassuring, common-denominator similarity.” 
For Freud, the reason the absence of the penis is disavowed – and here the reason 
social castration is seen but not fully appreciated – is not primarily concern for the other who 
bears this loss, but fear of castration. If this other person has no penis, the child imagines, I, 
too, may lose mine, and along with this there is the possibility of an accompanying fantasy 
that the woman may well have been on the receiving end of violence from the father, which 
lead to this loss. We see in the narrative an analogous process, the relating of racialized 
inequality to the possibility of the misfortune of inhabiting such a social space, the assertion 
that “I would never drink that,” the question of “whether I would ever get my hair cut there or 
at a place like this,” that is, the threat to one’s own position posed by one that “seemed 
always so different to my own.” It is perhaps for this reason that poor whites, “socially 
distant” and cut off from the white social body are “more anxiety provoking even than 
blacks.” 
This, however, is to focus only on the first and last paragraphs; between them is a 
digression that bears a heightened awareness of markers of racialized difference, as well as a 
preoccupation with dirt associated with blackness and disassociated from whiteness. 
Accompanying these concerns is also a marked focus on the rituals performed when 
confronted with this difference, the need, for instance, “to obey the right rules of disinterest, 
to maintain a measured distance, nothing by way of confrontation.”   
Useful in framing this aspect of the narrative is J.M. Coetzee’s (1991) essay “The 
Mind of Apartheid,” where he employed a Freudian metaphorics of obsessional neurosis to 
read the texts of Geoffrey Cronjé, an apartheid ideologue plagued by fears of racial mixing 
and the contamination of white racial purity whose writings informed the drafting of 
apartheid policy. Although the Apartheid Archive narrative is not of the same racist tone as 
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Cronjé’s writings, Coetzee’s essay assists in reading the more ‘obsessional neurotic’ features 
of the Apartheid Archive narrative, but also in providing a picture of a more orthodox 
Freudian ‘diagnosis’ in the service of a postcolonial agenda.   
Coetzee begins by pointing out a gap in orthodox historiographical 
explanations of how apartheid arose. The standard argument, he notes, was that 
apartheid legislation was a deplorable but nonetheless rational set of measures 
designed to bolster white privilege and improve the lot of the white Afrikaners, many 
of whom were poor in the 1940s. Coetzee does not deny that apartheid was in large 
part motivated by a material gain, but it was also a form of madness. “It did indeed 
flower out of self-interest and greed,” he states, “but it also flowered out of desire and 
out of the hatred of desire” (p. 2). That is to say, poor whites living in close proximity 
with people of other races presented not only the threat of a loss of racialised material 
advantage over blacks, but also the disintegration of racial distinction. In Cronjé’s 
words, “Unconsciously a gradual process of feeling equal (gelykvoeling) begins to 
take place in them,” and pretty soon, through inter-racial socializing and – horror of 
horrors – marriage, “a single South African mishmash-society” emerges (cited in 
Coetzee, 1991, p. 11).   
One of the characteristic features of obsessional neurosis is a reaction formation, the 
turning around of a forbidden wish into its opposite, from which a compromised form of 
gratification is derived, and, as Freud (1926) noted, “in order to achieve this end it will often 
make us of the most ingenious associative paths (p. 112, emphasis added). The last part of 
Freud’s (1926) formulation, italicised above, is exactly what Coetzee focuses on in his 
reading of Cronjé’s texts: he traces the condensations and displacements of Cronjé’s texts, the 
way they are “continually bursting at the seams and leaking” (Coetzee, 1991, p. 20) with 
precisely what is so vehemently denied. Thus, Coetzee reads apartheid segregation policies – 
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the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Mixed Marriages Act – as not 
only a “counterattack upon desire” (p. 17); on Coetzee’s reading, “the redrawing of the maps 
of cities, the redivision of the countryside, the removal and resettling of populations” (p. 17), 
all of this declares, symptomatically, desire displaced, lodged in its negation.  
It is not simply the case, though, that Cronjé’s obsessions with racial purity, with 
strict prohibitions on racial mixing, with the segregation policies that would make racial 
mixing if not impossible then at least unlawful, conjure this forbidden desire with each 
prohibition. Certainly Coetzee suggests that Cronjé is fascinated with what he forbids – 
mixing, contamination, miscegenation – and in this way what he repudiates he is “again and 
again returned to by his imagination” (p. 16, emphasis in original). More than this, though, in 
the theory of obsessional neurosis prohibitions are thought to be animated by precisely the 
desire that is repressed. As Freud (1907) put it, obsessional rituals “always reproduce 
something of the pleasure they are designed to prevent; they serve the repressed instinct no 
less than the agencies which are repressing it” (p. 125, emphasis added). Thus, if the path for 
the satisfaction of desire is its prohibition, if it is prohibited desire that pulses through the 
prohibition, then this “counterattack upon desire” could only have lead to further anxiety, to a 
horrified sense of contamination, creating further need for rituals of purification, for stricter, 
tighter controls on segregation.  
Anal erotism in Freud’s writings is central to his conceptualization of obsessional 
conduct (see, for e.g., Freud, 1918, 1909, 1908, 1907). And the conflicts of Freud’s 
obsessional patients frequently coalesced around issues of money; put differently, their 
anality played itself out over monetary concerns. Money, as Freud (1918) put it, is “a 
valuable substance, which in the course of the individual’s life, attracts the psychic interest 
which properly belongs to that product of the anal zone, faeces” (p. 82). On Coetzee’s 
reading, this is the site, the erotogenic zone, of Cronjé’s conflicts too. It is around a 
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“mishmash mengelmoes of races” (Cronjé cited in Coetzee, 1991, p. 9) that Cronjé’s 
text continually circles. And as Coetzee puts it, “In everyday usage the term 
mengelmoes is always derogatory. It implies a mixture in which not only individual 
character but all original structure has been lost; what is left behind is shapeless, 
undifferentiated and pulpy – much like faeces, in fact” (Coetzee, 1991, p. 10).3 
What Cronjé fears most, then, is undifferentiation, the loss of racial difference. 
It is not, however, as noted above, a loss of racialized privilege that Cronjé fears, not 
in any simple sense and not primarily; in addition to these concerns over financial 
power, and conducted through them, are a set of anxious repudiations, aversions, that 
ward off death: if different races are allowed to mix, and if whites are allowed to 
intermarry, then “we as white people will eventually cease to exist” (Cronjé cited in 
Coetzee, 1991, p. 8). To extend the above line of argument, then, if this 
“counterattack upon desire” served as a neurotic mode of satisfying what was 
prohibited, it could only, with each forced removal of the object of forbidden desire, 
bring the obsessional subject ever nearer to death, the death that this desire spelled for 
whiteness, a contamination of its purity, constituting, in the true Freudian sense, a 
repetition compulsion, not simply a repetition of the past, but one that leads towards 
that inorganic, undifferentiated state from which all living matter has come, a 
“circuitous path to death” (Freud, 1920, pp. 50-51).  
We would certainly stop short of diagnosing the narrator of the Apartheid Archive a 
racist in the mould of Cronjé; the obsessional features of the text, though, revolving around 
difference and sameness, mixture and separateness and the centrality of sexuality in the 
                                                          
3
 Such a visceral reaction to the impure, to the mixing of what should not be mixed, of course brings to mind 
Kristeva’s (1982) seminal account of the abject. For a detailed discussion of the notion of abjection in its 
application to colonial forms of racism, see Hook (2011) and Oliver (1993). 
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narrator’s anxieties about racial difference are certainly striking. We could also make a link 
here between castration anxieties and the obsessional features of this narrative, a connection 
made most clearly by Freud (1918) in his ‘Wolf man’ case. Freud’s patient had the 
overwhelming need to exhale whenever he saw beggars, cripples and ugly or disfigured 
people, and this was connected to his ritualistic breathing in of the holy spirit, and breathing 
out of evil spirits, thus associatively linking the act of inhaling and exhaling to obsessional 
concerns with anal expulsion; more to the point, feces and dirt, money and fears of 
misfortune, and concerns about mixing and contamination with the dirtiness of the wretched, 
all these things coalesce within a single moment that is determined from two sides: that of 
castration anxiety (ending up in their position) and obsessional neurosis (mixing, 
undifferentiation, irreconcilable aggression towards the unfortunate). It is not too hard to 
propose, then, that an encounter with those living in abject conditions could provoke both 
castration anxieties and obsessional concerns over what must be cast aside to live as one does 
insulated by racialized privilege, producing a narrative shot through with both the disavowal 
of difference and a compulsive framing of the scene in terms of rigid segregations and 
differences.    
This is, then, how a Freudian analysis of this narrative might proceed, the key point 
being that the problem, the ‘pathogenic nucleus,’ would be located, despite the obvious 
salience of the socio-cultural and political context, within the singular ego of the individual 
subject. The risk here is that individual diagnoses may prove a political impediment inasmuch 
as they lead away from more structural, sociological and economic modes of engagement and 
analysis (Adams, 1970; Sekyi-Out, 1996). Through the reification of psychological notions – 
obsessional neurosis, fetishism, castration anxiety and so on – such factors come to be viewed 
as foundational, as the primary mechanisms that establish and maintain structures of 
dispossession and inequality (Bulhan, 1980, 1985; Gibson, 2003). Fanon, as we show below, 
18 
 
steers away from the psychological reductionism that characterized many earlier attempts to 
use psychoanalysis beyond the clinic, attempting to direct his diagnostic attentions to 
pathological socio-historical conditions rather than to ‘colonial personalities.’ He nonetheless 
does not give up the locus of the individual and his diagnoses still pertain to subjectivities. As 
we will see, though, Fanon’s unorthodox borrowings from the history of psychoanalytic 
thought means that his is a strategic utilization of its concepts in order to produce a set of 
transformative theorizations. 
 
Fanon’s vernacularization of Freudian psychoanalysis 
As noted in the introduction, Fanon (1952) focuses on two related desires that constitute the 
pathology of the colonial situation, which are worth reiterating: “The black man wants to be 
white. The white man is desperately trying to achieve the rank of man” (p. xiii). Fanon tracks 
the implications of the desire to be white across the domains of language, sexuality, dreams 
and behaviour, finding in each instance the persistence of this wish. As an unconscious 
desire, it is one that is never stated as a verbal proposition; it is closer to the fantasmatic urge 
that underlies a variety of behaviours – from taking on white European language and culture, 
to the desire for a white spouse or sexual partner, cosmetic treatments of skin whitening, hair-
straightening, and so on. It is for this reason that Fanon draws inspiration from the clinical 
approach that Freud developed for the treatment of neurosis.  
As one might expect, a sexual aetiology is established in Fanon’s understanding these 
‘colonial disorders’; indeed, as Fanon (1952) asserts, “If we want to understand the racial 
situation psychoanalytically... considerable importance must be given to sexual phenomena” 
(p. 138). Fanon’s critical relationship to psychoanalysis, though, means that he revises crucial 
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Freudian conceptualizations.
4
 This gains pace as his arguments build, so much so that the 
ostensible ‘neuroses of lactification’ – the wish to be white – he describes are perhaps better 
understood within the ambit of ‘epidermalization,’ the internalization of broader inequalities. 
As Fanon (1952) says of the black man’s sense of inferiority, “The inferiority complex can be 
ascribed to a double process: First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization 
of this inferiority” (pp. xiv-xv). For Fanon, concrete social and political inequalities – 
structural causes – lie at the root of what may otherwise be seen as the more idiosyncratic or 
subjective constituents of neuroses. Fanon thus privileges what he calls ‘sociogeny’ or a 
‘sociodiagnostics.’ In this way it is more the pathological nature of society, “the neurotic 
structure of colonialism itself” (Fuss, 1994, p. 20) that is diagnosed, than an individual 
subject.  
Important an assertion as this is, politically, in avoiding a simplistically 
individualizing register of analysis, things are perhaps not always quite so clear cut as this, as 
we shall see. For although Fanon clearly departs from much of Freud’s meta-psychology, 
many of his theorizations in Black Skin, White Masks are not easily separated from a Freudian 
understanding of neurosis, particularly so in view of the constituent factors of sexuality, 
trauma and singular psychological disturbance that the use of the concept of neurosis 
commits one to, as well as the centrality of the psychoanalytic notion of identification within 
Fanon’s conception of epidermalization.  
Clinically, neurosis connotes a variety of irrational behaviours and symptoms that 
need to be understood as the outcome of psychical conflict between unconscious urges and 
                                                          
4
 For this reason one is tempted to side with Fanon against Macey’s (1999) charge of a “quite extraordinary 
misreading of Freud” (p. 12). While there is some truth to Macey’s assertion – Fanon arguably does not select 
the most appropriate Freudian text to grapple with dilemmas of neurosis – the point, it would seem, is that 
Fanon’s is a vernacular psychoanalysis; his is a precisely inventive recourse to Freud. 
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the social or cultural need to keep these urges outside of the conscious mind. Or in Fanon’s 
(1952) own description:  
 
The neurotic structure of an individual is precisely the elaboration, the 
formation, and the birth of conflicting knots in the ego, stemming on the one 
hand from the environment and on the other from the entirely personal way 
this individual reacts to these influences (p. 62, emphasis in original).  
 
One appreciates then the intractability of the psychical dilemma that Fanon sketches, that of 
the ‘dream of turning white,’ the wish to attain the level of humanity accorded to whites in 
racist or colonial contexts, as it comes into conflict with being in a black body within a racist 
society, which make this wish impossible.   
In searching for the cause, and thereby the potential cure, of neurotic disturbances, 
one is obliged – following Fanon’s reading of Freud – to turn to the childhood history of the 
individual. The symptoms of neurosis, furthermore, will always be linked to a trauma of 
sorts, which lends these symptoms their own distinctive, individual character. More than this, 
we are not necessarily looking for a single event, for the cause of the symptom most often 
arises out of “multiple traumas, frequently analogous and repeated” (Freud cited in Fanon, 
1952, p. 123). More importantly, this trauma need not have been that of an objective, 
empirical reality, an ‘actual’ event, it may just as well have been fantasized. It is this 
important conceptual leap which means that psychoanalysis can focus its curative efforts 
almost completely on elements of fantasy, on ‘psychical reality’ rather than on the facts of 
consensual objectivity. Hence, the neurosis of the black man or woman need not then have 
stemmed from actual experiences (the witnessing of the lynching of one’s father is the 
example Fanon gives), but rather from fantasized experiences, or, more to the point, from 
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indirect or cultural forms of oppression or trauma. Then again, one might argue, traumatic 
examples of racist violence, abuse and denigration would seem quite commonplace in the 
colonial domain.  
Describing this trauma Fanon (1952) states, drawing on Sartre, “It is the racist who 
creates the inferiorized” (p. 73). For Fanon, what makes a black person “an object among 
other objects” is the white gaze; as he stated, in a frequently cited passage, recounting how he 
was interpellated by the fearful gaze of a white child, “Look! A Negro!” (p. 89), the child 
says, “‘Mama, look, a Negro; I’m scared!’” (p. 91). There is a misrecognition of the black 
man here; but – and it is here that Fanon’s notion of ‘lactification’ emerges – it is through a 
“total identification with the white man” (p. 124), an identification with this white gaze, that 
the black man begins to misrecognize himself too: “I cast an objective gaze over myself, 
discovered my blackness, my ethnic features; deafened by cannibalism, backwardness, 
fetishism, racial stigmas, slave traders” (p. 92).  
To return to the Apartheid Archive narrative, one way to frame it is as an instance in 
which the black man is phantasmatically produced, objectified. However, one might suggest, 
following Fanon, that the potentially neurotic element of this encounter lies in the degree to 
which this is how the “black man in blue overalls” walking towards the narrator comes to see 
himself too, not only as belonging within certain racially designated zones, doing things that 
are characteristically black, but also through the white gaze, with which he has identified. 
Within the stark and pervasive racism of the colonial context, blackness is for the black man 
or woman, no less than for the white, in Fanon’s view, associated with “filth,” “thingness,” 
“squalor,” “worthlessness,” “moral inferiority”. It is, in Khanna’s (2003) terms, “a violence 
done to the black man so that he too sees other black men through white eyes” (p. 173), but 
the key insight Fanon offers is that the black man and the black woman come to see 
themselves through the same white gaze. 
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But it is not simply one encounter such as this that precipitates the neurosis Fanon 
describes. For Fanon, the colonial environment is so characterized by racism, by epistemic, 
psychological and physical types of oppression that these material and cultural forms of 
trauma may themselves, as opposed to more individual circumstances posited by Freud, act 
as the triggers of neurosis. Through the myriad racialized stories told to black and white 
children alike – stories in which “the Wolf, the Devil, the Wicked Genie, Evil, and the 
Savage are always represented by the Blacks or Indians” – the black child, Fanon argues, 
“identifies himself with the explorer, the civilizing colonizer, the white man who brings truth 
to the savages, a lily-white truth” (pp. 124-126). It is for this reason that Bhabha (1994) 
counts the young Fanon’s experience of racist Hollywood stereotypes of black men as one of 
the key ‘primal scenes’ of Black Skin, White Masks. 
The neurotic quality of what Fanon is describing here results not only from the desire 
for, but identifications with whiteness. Fanon (1952) sketches this dilemma in the following 
terms: if it is the case that, within colonial discourse, all that is repugnant and undesirable is 
black, and that I, as a black man or woman, order my life like that of a moral person, then 
“The only thing I know is the purity of my conscience and the whiteness of my soul” (p. 
169). Whiteness here functions as a moral category, as the basis, the template, of all that is 
positive. As Fanon puts it, “If I behave like a man with morals, I am not black” (p. 191). This 
process will always be a jarring one, because race is not, like other variables of 
discrimination – such as religion and ethnicity – easily hidden; it remains patently visible, 
particularly so in colonial regimes. It is for this reason that Fanon states that “the black man 
lives an ambiguity that is extraordinarily neurotic” (p. 169).  
To approach identification within Fanon’s formulation from a slightly different angle, 
the concept of epidermalization bears some resemblance to the psychoanalytic notion of 
introjection, the psychic process of taking into the ego and its fantasy world objects from the 
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external world, prototypically parental objects or parts thereof.
5
  Fanon’s concept of 
epidermalization, though, has a far more politicized epistemology than that of introjection. 
Epidermalization, offers Hall (1996), is “literally, the inscription of race on the skin” (1996, 
p. 16). Or in Khanna’s (2003) words, it is a conception of how “the historical and economic 
shape the perception of the biological” (p. 172, emphasis in original). We are better placed, 
then, to appreciate what Fanon attempts by way of his ‘sociogenetic’ diagnoses. These are 
diagnoses that have departed from the psychoanalytic premises that initially informed them. 
They are not predominantly clinical categories and they pertain less to individuals than to the 
socio-historical conditions in which the oppressed find themselves, a form of analysis that 
cannot easily be accused of vulgar psychologization. This makes for an important warning for 
a postcolonial psychoanalysis more broadly: in his recourse to a psychoanalytic interpretative 
approach, Fanon insists that such neuroses, despite being ‘wired through’ the sexual realms, 
through unconscious processes, are ultimately derived from inequalities present in wider 
social structures. They cannot as such be viewed as outcomes of personality factors of the 
colonized, or reduced to the internal psychical workings of individual subjects. There is, 
however, even in his ‘socio-genetic’ diagnoses, a need to account for the ways in which 
individual subjects become psychically fastened to colonial discourse, and identification 
functioned for Fanon as one such account.  
In light of how centrally placed identification is in Fanon’s (1952) thinking, it is worth 
taking seriously Fuss’ (1994) argument regarding the coloniality of the concepts Fanon 
                                                          
5
 Introjection is frequently defined in opposition to projection – the expulsion of unpleasant impulses, most often 
through repudiation – and usually denotes a merging with the object; as such, introjection is closely associated 
with psychoanalytic formulations of identification. Introjection is a phantasmatic process that finds its bodily 
analogue in orality, ingestion, as opposed to excretion. At a basic level, then, it is through introjection that a 
subject is able to assert, ‘I am like this’ (I have taken this in, I am identified with it), and through projection, ‘I 
am not like that’ (I have spat that out, excreted it) (Freud, 1925). 
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repeats, suggesting that identification “be placed squarely within its other historical 
genealogies, including colonial imperialism” (p. 20). Although Fanon undoubtedly 
complicates the teleology of Western civilization, the notion of incorporation, frequently 
associated with Hegelian dialectics but also inseparable from psychoanalytic formulations of 
‘identification as introjection,’ is not only analogous to bodily processes – although Fuss does 
suggest the alimentary and the excretory when she refers to “the imperialist act of 
assimilation that drives Europe’s voracious colonialist appetite” (p. 23) – it also, as Fuss 
argues with reference to Robert Young, “mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and 
economic absorption of the non-European world by the West” (Young cited in Fuss, 1994, p. 
23). Identification, Fuss suggests, is a kind of psychic geopolitics, “an imperial process, a 
form of violent appropriation in which the Other is deposed and assimilated into the lordly 
domain of Self” (p. 23). Although much more could be made of Fuss’ argument and of her 
discussion of Fanon’s use of identification, it should suffice to note that, even in the hands of 
Fanon, in his anti-colonial socio-diagnostic psychoanalysis, there is an indissoluble element 
of coloniality. 
 While Fuss focuses on identification in Fanon’s writing, we can push the point about 
the coloniality of psychoanalysis in a somewhat different direction, with reference to the 
Apartheid Archive narrative. Certainly there are some prominent psychoanalytic themes in 
the narrative. It is sometimes argued, however, that psychoanalysis ought to be a part of the 
arsenal of critical psychology not because it is able to discern the hidden, and therefore actual 
psychic mechanisms at work within a given setting, but rather because psychoanalysis has 
saturated commonsense conceptions of subjectivity, because it has attained a certain truth 
status and holds tremendous influence over how we understand ourselves as psychological 
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subjects (Billig, 1996; Parker, 2008, 2003).
6
 Much of the literature proposing this has looked 
at a Western European or US context, where – to risk a generalization – being in analysis or 
therapy was once a rite of passage and a generation grew up watching Woody Allen and 
Alfred Hitchcock films, with their direct and – often more persuasive – implicit references to 
psychoanalytic ideas. Whereas Ian Parker, a key proponent in arguing for such an approach, 
sees the pervasive hold of psychoanalysis as the product of an increasingly industrialized 
society, the establishment of the nation state and – particularly important in his argument – 
the rise of capitalism (2010), we have already suggested above the related but somewhat 
different set of reasons psychoanalysis may have taken hold of commonsense in the former 
colonies: it found fertile ground in the logic of colonialism.  
To apply such an approach to this narrative would mean, in Parker’s (2003) terms, that 
one should be less concerned with using psychoanalytic concepts to diagnose the 
remembering subject of this narrative as pathological; rather, one could presume that one is 
dealing with a text that is “already interpreted by psychoanalysis” (p. 22). That is to say, the 
recollection of the apartheid past is given its armature by a range of psychoanalytic ideas, 
which, despite going unreferenced, give the narrative a distinctly psychoanalytic shape.  
It is worth emphasizing that the psychoanalytic regularities of the Apartheid Archive 
narrative are not its own, they are a part of a broader discourse on memory after apartheid. 
While it is unsurprizing that an academic project like the Apartheid Archive would be guided 
by the notion that “traumatic experiences from the past will constantly attempt to re-inscribe 
themselves (often in masked form) in the present if they are not acknowledged, interrogated 
                                                          
6
 Michael Billig (1999), for example, proposes that psychoanalysis not only reveals how repression happens, but 
also that, as a pervasive discourse, it offers repression as a resource for subjectivity, that is, it gives subjects a 
way of being and acting in the world. 
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and addressed,”7 we see the wider influence of psychoanalysis when we consider “the 
psycho-theological tendencies of the TRC” (Feldman, 2003, p. 239), indeed how “much of 
the language of the TRC is inherently psychoanalytic” (Swartz & Drennan, 2000, p. 206). 
Consider two related objectives of the TRC: on the one hand, catharsis – which although it 
has its origins in the Greek kátharsis, purification, also has a psychoanalytic lineage in 
Freud’s early work with Breuer – and, on the other, to remember apartheid so as not to repeat 
it, that is, a national past was to be given words rather than acted out (see Freud, 1914). This 
is, in brief, what Feldman (2003) has called the TRC’s commitments to the “ad hoc 
therapeutics of ‘the talking cure’” (p. 239).8  
Although psychoanalytic theorizing and practice in South Africa goes back some way, 
to the work of Wulf Sachs (1937) and I.D. Macrone (1937), Feldman (2004) has argued that 
the ‘talking cure’ dimensions of the TRC were driven largely by “the white-dominated 
media” (p. 174) and by “key actors in the TRC, as they negotiated their post-commission 
careers” (p. 184). Despite arguing that psychotherapeutics is not the whole story of the TRC, 
Feldman sees it as worthy of serious consideration: “What occurs,” he asks, “when 
historiography is grounded by a disciplinary concept that purports to exist outside of 
                                                          
7
 Official Apartheid Archive website, accessed 10 April 2012 
(http://www.apartheidarchive.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=4). 
8
 Indeed, this injunction to remember so as not to repeat is also written into the constitution of South Africa, 
providing the conditions according to which one becomes a subject of the post-apartheid nation. This is the 
founding interpellation of the subject of the post-apartheid nation. “We, the people of South Africa / Recognize 
the injustices of our past,” as the preamble to The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, begins. Thus, a 
person only becomes one of “the people of South Africa” through the recognition of the “injustices of our past” 
– this gaze towards the past as an injustice is “the mark of authenticity,” as Ivor Chipkin (2007, p. 102) puts it.  
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historical time to the degree that it is anchored in philosophical anthropology and its cognates 
medicine, psychology, law, or theodicy?” (p. 185).   
One consequence, sharply criticised by many – and frequently prefaced by the 
observation that ‘national trauma’ and ‘national healing’ are misnomers, nations do not have 
psyches, people do – is that a picture of individualised, pathologised and depoliticised trauma 
is created, concealing systemic injustice and institutionalised racism, with memory and 
amnesty being substituted for economic redress and justice (Grunebaum, 2011; Mamdani, 
1996). As Feldman puts it: “stressing memory’s therapeutic possibilities [often occurs] at the 
expense of establishing its pathogenic connection to institutional violence and that violence’s 
inherence in economic racism” (Feldman, 2003, p. 260; see also Craps, 2010; Feldman, 2004; 
Posel, 2002).  
There is a less frequently noted but related consequence set in play by attempts at 
remembering South Africa’s national past. Such an impetus to remember has – in large part – 
been set in motion and given shape by the TRC. It was, after all the TRC that formalized the 
South African past as an injustice in order to inaugurate the post-apartheid national subject 
who recognizes it as such. This broad project of remembering deploys the same opposition 
between primitivity and civilization that proved so crucial to colonial relations of domination. 
The frame, however, is inverted: it is apartheid, specifically its violence – rather than the 
racially marked subject colonialism produced as its opposite and undeveloped other – that is 
linked to primitivity, and it is this that cannot be admitted to post-apartheid sociality. The 
TRC final report in fact cautions, at least in parts (see ‘Causes, Motives and Perspectives of 
Perpetrators,’ Truth and Reconciliation of South Africa Report, 1998 [2007], p. 276- 285), 
against the invocation of evolutionary theory to explain the violence of apartheid as a 
primordial or primitive throwback. The suggestion, then, that apartheid became, through the 
TRC, a form of primitivity against which the post-apartheid nation has constituted itself 
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seems unfounded. However, one might argue that rather than guiding the TRC – and the 
present it secured against this past – away from evolutionary, anthropological thinking, the 
report simply registered the risks of the process, which is precisely what it could not avoid. In 
Feldman’s (2004) words what we are called to witness is the “archaicization of the past” (p. 
169).  
We have a paradoxical situation here, then: if the remembering of the apartheid past is 
underpinned by psychoanalytic notions of the talking cure then there is a latent form of 
coloniality at its very centre; not simply in the sense that it must keep coloniality on the 
threshold of death but nonetheless alive so as to negate it, so as to be anti-colonial or anti-
apartheid, but rather that the negation, and the recognition of the past as an injustice, finds its 
very words in the language of a discourse that shares its epistemological foundations with 
colonialism.
9
  Certainly there have been rigorous critiques of the positivism and empiricism 
of the TRC, which place it within a modernist epistemology; the colonial underpinnings of 
the TRC, however, its rootedness in evolutionary thinking, its spectacular recapitulation of 
the passage from primitivity to civilization – to draw on both Brickman (2003) and Feldman 
(2004) – needs to be acknowledged. 
Thus, in the Apartheid Archive narrative, at one level the injustices of the apartheid 
past are recognized, they are given words rather than repeated; at another, though, at the 
epistemological level, that of the framework through which that past is recalled, an 
unacknowledged “kinship and symmetry” between psychoanalysis and colonialism is acted 
out; the narrator “repeats it,” as Freud (1914) says of the transferential repetition of the 
analysand with the analyst, “without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (p. 15). 
Although the effects of this kind of repetition, this acting out at the epistemological level, 
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 Of course, this is not a new problem; indeed, it is the central problem taken up by postcolonial theorists (see 
Bhabha, 1994) and, for that matter, the Subaltern Studies group too (see Spivak, 1988). 
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would no doubt be more subtle in many instances, in the Apartheid Archive narrative they are 
quite stark. No matter how reflexive the narrative at first appears, no matter how repugnant 
the narrator is able to find the race thinking of apartheid, at the end of the day he cannot 
recognize the human in the black man he sees walking towards him; the black man remains a 
body (an overdetermined black penis that threatens the white male with castration) without a 
consciousness. The effect of the repetition here, then, is that the encounter remains within the 
libidinal economy of a colonial fantasy.  
 
Conclusion 
What we can say now, with the benefit of genealogies of psychoanalysis that had not been 
written at the time Fanon was alive, is that he made the first steps towards addressing 
psychoanalysis as a part of the very social structure he diagnosed. What Fanon’s work 
demonstrates, though – despite the fact that he devoted as much time to critiquing and 
altering psychoanalytic concepts as he did analyzing colonial relations using psychoanalytic 
theory – is the impossibility of an un-colonial psychoanalysis. Indeed, in deploying 
psychoanalysis as a form of postcolonial critique, the very thing one is looking for – 
repetitions of the colonial past – resides, also, displaced, in the act of looking for it. This is a 
point dramatized in the Apartheid Archive narrative, but also, even if in less obvious ways, in 
more formal psychoanalytic studies such as Coetzee’s (1991) and, indeed, Fanon’s (1952).   
It is, however, in the distance and difference between Freud and Fanon’s ambivalent 
appropriation of the conceptual apparatus of psychoanalysis, in the movement from classical 
Freudian psychoanalysis to Fanon’s vernacular psychoanalysis, that there lies the possibility 
of bringing into focus the enduring influence of colonial thought. This persistent influence 
exists, perhaps contrary to expectations, even in readings of coloniality, in ostensibly critical 
and progressive forms of remembering the past.  
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A last point needs to be made. Given what has been discussed above regarding the 
psychoanalytic conception of identification, it is potentially problematic for two ‘white’ 
South African academics to be suggesting that Fanon’s work be ‘incorporated’ into the study 
of postcolonial subjectivities. It is, however, precisely the introduction of Fanon’s thought 
that renders such an incorporation problematic. As such, despite the contradictions of what 
has been proposed here, namely, the prospect that elements of Fanon’s thought  remain 
within the incorporative logic of colonialism, this thought functions simultaneously to 
complicate the psychoanalysis of coloniality. This proves crucial, for it is in view of the 
recognition that the psychoanalysis of coloniality can never be fully un-colonial, that we can, 
perhaps, approach becoming postcolonial.   
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